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Fergusen v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 69 (Sept. 11, 2008)1
CRIMINAL LAW – COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
Summary
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, upon jury verdict, of one count each of burglary,
sexual assault, robbery, and first-degree kidnapping.
Disposition/ Outcome
Reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded this matter for a new trial, so long as
Fergusen is found to be competent to stand trial.
Factual and procedural History
In 2003, Fergusen was charged with burglary, sexual assault, robbery, and first-degree
kidnapping.2 In 2005, Fergusen’s defense counsel filed a motion to declare Nevada’s
competency standard unconstitutional. At the hearing, defense counsel stated that two
psychologists had deemed Fergesen incompetent to stand trial. In response, the district court
ordered Fergesen be sent to Lake’s Crossing Center for a competency determination.3
In 2005, the Eighth Judicial District Court assigned the determination of all competency
matters to Eighth Judicial District Court Judge Jackie Glass (Department 5). Thus, when
Fergusen returned from Lake’s Crossing, Department 5 handled the proceedings related to his
competency. Fergusens’ defense counsel was unable to be present at these court proceedings.
The deputy public defender who was “covering” for Fergusen’s defense attorney asked for a
continuance. The court denied this request and went ahead with the competence hearing. At the
hearing, the district court received a report which stated that three doctors at Lake’s Crossing had
deemed Fergusen competent to stand trial. Based on this, Department 5 determined Fergusen to
be competent and ordered the case to proceed to trial. Fergusen’s trial was assigned to Eighth
Judicial District Court Judge Stewart L. Bell (Department 7).
During a status check hearing in Department 7, defense counsel informed the district
court that, prior to Fergusen being sent to Lake’s Crossing, they had planned on presenting
evidence that Fergusen could never be deemed competent to stand trial. Also, defense counsel
informed the district court that they had not received the Lake’s Crossing report relied on during
the Department 5 competency hearing.4 The trial court informed defense counsel that they could
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By Tara Zimmerman
After he was bound over to district court for trial, many continuances relating to Fergusen’s competency were
granted throughout 2004 and 2005.
3
Lake’s Crossing Center is a mental health facility operated by the Division of Mental Health and Developmental
Services of the Department of Health and Human Services (Division).
4
Nearly two months after this status check, defense counsel informed Department 5 that they still had not received
the report from Lake’s Crossing. However, at a later hearing, defense counsel informed the court that their office
had received the report sometime earlier and that it apparently was not transferred to the deputy public defender
assigned to Fergusen’s case.
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file a motion arguing that Fergusen could never be deemed competent, but, it would be
considered by Department 5. Nearly two months later, defense counsel filed a motion for a
hearing as to competency challenging the report made by the Lake’s Crossing treatment team.
The hearing was conducted in Department 5. At the hearing, the State objected to the
motion as untimely.5 After hearing arguments, Department 5 decided it would grant defense
counsel’s motion for a hearing as to competency prior to Fergusen’s trial date set by Department
7.6,7 Subsequently, however, Department 5 notified the parties that it had reconsidered its
decision and was no longer going to grant the motion.8 At the subsequent hearing, Department 5
found that Fergusen was competent to stand trial and thus, a hearing as to competency was not
warranted. The court based its decision on its review of the Lake’s Crossing report and reports
from the detention center. They further stated that despite defense counsel’s assertion that
Fergusen was unable to aid and assist in his defense, Fergusen did not meet the standard for
incompetency under Dusky v. United States.9 Defense counsel objecting to Department 5’s
findings and filed an offer of proof and affidavit under seal with respect to what defense counsel
would have shown if there had been a hearing as to competency.
Fergusen’s case was consequently, transferred back to Department 7. Defense counsel
filed another motion for a competency hearing.10 Department 7 held a hearing on the new
motion. At the hearing, Department 7 denied defense counsel’s motion because Department 5
had previously found defense counsel’s arguments to be without merit and Fergusen to be
competent to stand trial. Defense counsel subsequently filed a writ petition with the Supreme
Court of Nevada, which was ultimately denied.11
Shortly before trial, defense counsel orally informed Depertment 7 that they were having
Fergusen see some psychologists who would possibly deem him incompetent to stand trial.
Department 5 informed the parties that it would not consider evidence relating to competency
from doctors who were not appointed by Department 5. Further, despite defense counsel’s
reiteration that Fergusen was not communicating with counsel, the district court ordered that trial
would proceed as scheduled.
On the first day of trial, defense counsel filed a motion to strike all the rulings made by
Department 5 and to compel a de novo hearing as to Fergusen’s competency. Defense counsel
argued that the district court should have stricken Department 5’s rulings because Department 5
had attempted to file an amicus curiae brief in the defense’s writ petition, therefore, Department
5

The state also argued that it had been informed by the detention center that Fergusen had been requesting
documents to aid in his defense and was hoarding his medications in order to sell them. This, they argue is evidence
of his competency. Additionally, the state argued that defense counsel had not presented any new reports and were
incorrectly basing their challenge on evaluations that occurred prior to Fergusen’s evaluation at Lake’s Crossing.
6
The Court reasoned that because it had considered untimely motions in other cases, it would do so here as well.
7
Additionally, Department 5 offered to provide a subpoena or court order allowing defense counsel to obtain
Fergusen’s “day-to-day treatment” reports from Lake’s Crossing.
8
The Judge held a chambers conference, in which the court apparently asked defense counsel to provide additional
reasons to justify a competency hearing. Defense counsel argued that Fergusen was incompetent because he did not
have the present ability to aid and assist defense counsel. Five days later, Department 5 held a hearing to make a
record of what had taken place during the chambers conference.
9
363 U.S. 402 (1960)
10
Defense counsel made the same arguments as they had in the previous motion considered by Department 5, and
additionally argued that counsel had to file their first motion without the benefit of the Lake’s Crossing report and
that no formal findings of competency had been made by the district court.
11
Fergusen v. Dist Ct., Docket No. 47159 (Order Denying Petition, July 27, 2006)

5 had manifested bias and prejudice. Further, defense counsel maintained that Fergusen was still
not able to consult with defense counsel. The district court allowed defense counsel to file their
motion to strike, but did not consider it. Defense counsel thereafter requested a stay and filed
another writ petition seeking the Supreme Court’s intervention, which was denied
Fergusen was found guilty of all charges at the jury trial. At sentencing, defense counsel
requested a continuance because they were unable to review the parole and probation report with
Fergusen. Defense counsel also asked the district court for additional time to allow Fergusen to
undergo a psychiatric evaluation and further asserted that Fergusen needed to be sent back to
Lake’s Crossing pursuant to Nevada’s competency statutes, The district court disagreed.12
Consequently, the district court sentenced Fergusen, and this appeal followed.
Discussion
Determination of all competency issues by Department 5
Fergusen argued that Nevada law does not authorize the Eighth Judicial District Court to
delegate the adjudication of all competency matters to Department 5. Specifically, Fergusen
contended that EDCR 1.33 does not specifically provide for the assignment of all competency
matters to a particular district court judge. The Court determined that under EDCR 1.30(b)(5),
1.60(a), and 3.10(b), the chief judge of the Eighth Judicial District has the discretion to assign the
determination of all competency matters to Department 5. And, while EDCR 1.33 does not
explicitly provide for a specialized competency court division, it does not limit the chief judge’s
authority under EDCR 1.30(b)(5), 1.60(a), and 3.10(b).
Next, the court concluded that the determination of a defendant’s ongoing competency
during trial must vest with the trial judge assigned to adjudicate the matter. In reaching this
conclusion, the court adhered to the holding of the United States Supreme Court decision, Drope
v. Missouri.13 Thus, the court concluded that any assignment of a competency determination to a
different competency judge during trial would violate Drope v. Missouri because “a trial judge is
the only adjudicator who can, among other things, assess firsthand a defendant’s present ability
to consult with his or her lawyer and determine whether a defendant’s present behavior and
demeanor during trial demonstrate that he or she is not competent to stand trial.”14
The right to a hearing as to competency
Fergusen argued that the district court erred by not affording him a hearing to challenge
the report as to competency under NRS 178.455 and NRS 178.460 after he returned from Lake’s
Crossing.15 Further, Fergusen argued that this refusal violated his due process rights to a hearing
constitutionally guaranteed under Pate v. Robinson.16 Fergusen additionally argued that he
12

The court noted that Fergusen had engaged in conversations with the district court every day while waiting for
defense counsel’s arrival in the courtroom and based on its daily conversations with Fergusen, the district court
determined that defense counsel’s request to send Fergusen back to Lake’s Crossing was not warranted.
13
420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975) (stating that while a defendant may be competent at the commencement of trial, the trial
court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the defendant incompetent to
stand trial). The court recognized that “evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any
prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial” are relevant factors in assessing competency. Id. at 180.
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Fergusen v. State, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 69 (Sept. 11, 2008) (emphasis in original).
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Under NRS 178.460, Fergusen would be allowed to examine and contest the report prepared by Lake’s Crossing,
16
383 U.S. 375 (1966)

should have been afforded a hearing because his counsel had raised competency concerns as to
his ability to aid and assist counsel at that time. Finally, Fergusen argued that because his
counsel was not present at the proceeding that had taken place upon his return from Lake’s
Crossing, that proceeding was a “sham.”
In response, the State argued that Fergusen’s request for a hearing under NRS 178.460
was untimely. Additionally, the State argued that a hearing as to competency was not required
because, under Morales v. State,17 a hearing as to competency is only required when there is
reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s competency. The State argued that defense counsel failed
to present evidence that amounted to reasonable doubt because all the evidence relied upon in
defense counsel’s motion for a competency hearing was supported by medical findings that were
made prior to Fergusen’s commitment to Lake’s Crossing. Thus, the State contended that a
hearing as to competency was not warranted.
In Morales, the Supreme Court reiterated its holding in Melchor-Gloria v. State,18 and
stated that “[w]here there is reasonable doubt regarding a defendant’s competency, a district
court’s failure to order a competency evaluation constitutes an abuse of discretion and a denial of
due process.”19 Further, under Nevada law, a district court is required to suspend proceedings
against a defendant at any time during the proceedings, “if doubt arises as to the competence of
the defendant.”20 When a defendant is deemed incompetent and sent to a facility for a
competency evaluation, the Administrator of the Division is required to submit a report. 21 NRS
178.460 provides that “the judge shall hold a hearing” concerning the Administrator’s report if
such a hearing is requested within 10 days of receiving the report. 22 Thus, upon a timely request,
the district court must afford a defendant a hearing after his return from a mental health facility
to allow counsel to examine and contest the report prepared by the treatment team.
The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying Fergusen’s
request for a continuance at the hearing after his return from Lake’s Crossing. The court
reasoned that while Fergusen did have an attorney present with him, the deputy public defender
present was not his attorney. As such, the court held that Fergusen had not been afforded a
meaningful opportunity to confer with his counsel prior to the hearing. Thus, the court
concluded that Fergusen was denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard and was denied the
meaningful opportunity to challenge the findings made in the Lake’s Crossing report.23
The court further concluded that Department 5 abused its discretion in not granting a
hearing as to competency upon defense counsel’s motion. The court noted that the motion may
have been untimely under NRS 178.460, however, a competency hearing was warranted because
defense counsel had presented evidence that raised sufficient reasonable doubt as to Fergusen’s
competency to stand trial. As such, the court ultimately concluded that Department 5 should
17

116 Nev. 19, 992 P.2d 252 (2000)
99 Nev. 174, 660 P.2d 252 (2000),
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116 Nev. at 22, 992 P.2d at 254 (citing Ford v. State, 102 Nev. 126, 133, 717 P.2d 27, 31-32 (1986) and MelchorGloria, 99 Nev. at 180, 660 P.2d at 113); see also Pate, 383 U.S. at 385.
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NRS 178.405(1).
21
NRS 178.455(1).
22
The Court also noted that evidence received at every stage of the competency proceedings may be relevant to the
defendant’s competency and should be considered at such a competency hearing. Calvin v. State 122 Nev. 1178,
1183, 147 P.3d 1097, 1100 (2006).
23
See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the
opportunity to be heard.”).
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have afforded defense counsel the opportunity to present their evidence relating to Fergusen’s
competency during a hearing.
CHERRY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Justice Cherry concurred that appellant’s judgment of conviction should be reversed and his
case remanded for a new trial, if he is deemed competent. He also agreed with the majority that
the determination of a defendant’s ongoing competency during trial must vest with the trial judge
who has been assigned to hear the matter. He also reluctantly agreed with the majority that the
Eighth Judicial District Court has the discretion to assign the determination of all initial
competency matters to Department 5 (emphasis added). However, because the trial judge needs
to continuously manage the ongoing criminal prosecution, it is Justice Cherry’s opinion that once
a defendant has been committed to a mental health facility such as Lake’s Crossing, and is
returned to the district court upon being found competent to stand trial, the appropriate member
of the judiciary to determine competency is the trial judge rather than Department 5.
Conclusion
The court concluded that the Eighth Judicial District has the discretion to assign the
determination of all competency matters to Department 5. However, the determination of a
defendant’s ongoing competency during trial must vest with the trial judge who has been
assigned to adjudicate the matter. They further concluded that the district court abused its
discretion in denying Fergusen’s request for a continuance upon his return from Lake’s
Crossing. And, the district court’s refusal to grant Fergusen a hearing as to competency upon his
return from Lake’s Crossing violated his right to a fair trial. Accordingly, the court reversed the
judgment of conviction and remanded this matter for a new trial, so long as Fergusen is found to
be competent to stand trial.24
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The court further concluded that Department 7 should have granted Fergusen a competency hearing when defense
counsel filed their motion to strike all the rulings made by Department 5 and to compel a de novo hearing as to
Fergusen’s competency. Upon reviewing the evidence, the court found that by supporting their motion by
evaluations that had taken place after Fergusen’s commitment to Lake’s Crossing, defense counsel had sufficiently
raised doubt as to Fergusen’s competency. Thus, in light of the new evidence presented by defense counsel, the
court concluded that Department 7 erred in yielding to Department 5’s competency determination. Likewise, they
concluded that Department 7’s view that Department 5 would not consider any evidence relating to competency
from any doctors who are not appointed by the district court violated the holding in Calvin, 122 Nev. at 1183, 147
P.3d at 1100.

